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EXCLUSION OF DEPOSITIONS FROM THE JURY ROOM:
AN ANACHRONISM IN TEXAS RULE 281
GEORGE H. SPENCER, JR.
In every trial which reaches the point of jury deliberation, the court must
decide which exhibits may be taken to the jury room. In Texas, that
decision is primarily controlled by Rule 281 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that all written evidence, except depositions, may be taken to
the jury room.' Although basically sound, that rule is nonetheless subject to
criticism in that it perpetuates an exception, the exclusion of depositions,
despite the fact that the justification for the exception has been rendered
illogical by subsequent developments in trial practice.
Depositions were originally excluded from the jury room to prevent their
over-emphasis relative to in-court oral testimony, but that justification is
anachronistic. 2 It assumes that oral evidence--depositions and in-court
1. TEx. R. Civ. P. 281 states:

The jury may take with them in their retirement the charges and instructions, general or special, which were given and read to them, and any written evidence,
except the depositions of witnesses, but shall not take with them any special charges
which have been refused. Where only a part of a paper has been read in evidence,
the jury shall not take the same with them, unless the part so read to them is
detached from that which was excluded.
The provisions of rule 281 have been interpreted as being mandatory; written evidence
must go to the jury room on the written motion of either party. Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n v. Applegate, 205 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1947, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see Trinity & B.V. Ry. v. Lunsford, 183 S.W. 112, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1915, no writ); Baird & Scales v. Tyler Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 147 S.W. 1168, 1173 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1912, no writ). Since each party has a right to have the written
evidence before the jury during deliberations, a refusal to allow such evidence to go to
the jury room on the ground that the jurors have not specificaUy requested it is error.
Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Orr, 147 Tex. 383, 391, 215 S.W.2d 862, 866-67 (1948);
Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Durkee, 193 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Banker's Life Co. v. Butler, 122 S.W.2d 1077, 1079 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1938, no writ).
2. It was said that allowing depositions to go to the jury room would permit the
jurors to read and re-read them, thereby emphasizing that evidence at the expense of
in-court testimony which the jurors were forced to remember. English v. American &
Foreign Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ); Butler v. Abilene Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n, 108 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1937, writ dism'd); England v. Pitts, 56 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932,
writ dism'd); see Harris v. Levy, 217 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948,
no writ); Trinity & B.V. Ry. v. Lunsford, 183 S.W. 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1915, no writ). This rationale is reflected in the appellate courts' treatment of the issue
of error in this area. To constitute reversible error, it should be shown not only that a
deposition was taken back, but that it was 'used by the jury during its deliberations, and
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testimony-is the only important form of evidence given during a trial, and
that it would be unfair to favor one class of such evidence over the other.
While at one time this reasoning may have been true, it is not so today; other
non-oral forms of evidence, most notably photographs, are used extensively
in modem trials.5 These other forms of evidence are allowed to go to the
jury room and are, therefore, emphasized relative to both classes of oral
testimony. 4 Consequently, rule 281's exclusion of depositions, although
designed to protect oral evidence, has the opposite effect; it renders it
inferior to non-oral forms of evidence.
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUDING DEPOSITIONS

Common Law Background
In order to fully understand the purpose of rule 281, it is worthwhile to
consider its common law background. Although the common law left to the
trial court's discretion the question of whether or not non-documentary
evidence should be permitted in the jury room, 5 the rule governing documentary evidence was strict: absent the consent of both parties, only sealed
writings could properly be taken to the jury room for use during deliberation. 6

Since matters stated under seal were conclusive and self-proving, 7 the

that such use was actually prejudicial to the complaining party. See Willis v. Goodrum,
360 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Texas
Elec. Serv. Co. v. Linebery, 327 S.W.2d 657, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ
dism'd) (party complaining of error in jury receiving written materials not introduced
in evidence must prove both that error occurred and injury probably resulted). It should
be noted that a failure to object to a deposition being used during jury deliberations probably waives the error. See Beeks v. Odom, 70 Tex. 183, 189, 7 S.W. 702, 705 (1888);
Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Linebery, 327 S.W.2d 657, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959,
writ dism'd).
3. See generally Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and the Adequate Award, 22 Miss.
L.J. 284 (1951); Knepper, Exhibits and Demonstrative Evidence, 30 INS. COUNSEL J.
133 (1963); Ladd, Demonstrative Evidence and Expert Opinion, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
4. Photographs constitute "written evidence" under rule 281 and are properly sent
to the jury room. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Crow, 148 Tex. 113, 114, 221 S.W.2d
235, 236 (1949). No specific rule of civil procedure governs the taking of real, nondocumentary, evidence to the jury room; it is a matter for trial court discretion. See
Linch v. Paris Lumber & Grain Elev. Co., 80 Tex. 23, 35, 15 S.W. 208, 212 (1891)
(in action for breach of building contract, within trial court discretion to allow piece
of broken cast iron column, in evidence, to be taken to jury room); Medrano v. City
of El Paso, 231 S.W.2d 514, .516 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, no writ); Davis v.
Callen, 250 S.W. 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923, no writ) (proper to allow
mechanical model of shaker bar to go to jury room in suit by railroad fireman for injuries caused by defective shaker bar on engine). See generally 3 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 14.08.2, at 556 (rev. ed. 1970).
5. Wilson v. People, 84 P.2d 463, 467 (Colo. 1938).
6. E.g., Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 115 P. 313, 314-15 (Cal. 1911);
Wilson v. People, 84 P.2d 463, 467 (Colo. 1938); People v. Bartone, 172 N.Y.S.2d 976,
980 (Westchester County Ct. 1958).
7. IX W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 154-55 (3d ed. 1944).
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clear purpose in allowing the sealed papers to go to the jury room was to
permit the jurors to verify, from their own knowledge, the genuineness of the
seal, and not to give them an opportunity to read the papers. 8 In any event,
it was unlikely that the papers could have been read since the jurors were
almost exclusively illiterate.9 This also seems to be the reason why unsealed
papers were excluded from the jury room-apart from verifying a seal, the
jurors had no possible use for a document. Apparently the early courts were
not concerned about evidence, as such, in the jury room or they would
not have permitted the use of real evidence, sealed papers, and even unsealed papers, when both parties consented. Nevertheless, an elaborate justification for the sealed paper rule was propounded in the eighteenth century by Lord Gilbert. He argued first, that since sealed papers were
inherently more valuable and important, it was proper that they should
make the final impression on the jury; second, that sealed papers often
contained complicated matters and were of little value if merely read to
the jury; and finally, that since only sealed writings had a "credit," or value,
apart from the credit given by a court, only they had "credit" when physically
10
removed from a court.
This argument has, as Professor Wigmore notes, the ring of artificiality
and contrivance." Apparently Lord Gilbert found the rule and then merely
sought to support it, without considering whether it continued to be desirable.
In fact, it no longer was so. Many jurors could read by the eighteenth
century and consequently, the reason for the rule's existence had disappeared.
Of course, the sealed papers rule is no longer the law, but the same
unquestioning spirit which prompted Lord Gilbert to defend the rule after its
purpose had vanished remains and is currently responsible for the perpetuation of the exclusion of depositions from the jury room. Whatever utility
that exclusion once had is now past, and the argument normally introduced
in defense of it-protection against over-emphasis-is no longer tenable.
The Over-emphasis Argument
Depositions are an exception to the traditional notion that testimony
should be given in open court, in the presence of the parties, their counsel,
the court, the jury, and the public.' 2 Because they are in derogation of the
8. Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 115 P. 313, 315 (Cal. 1911).
9. Id. at 315.

10. J.

GILBERT, EVIDENCE

17 (1726), quoted in VI J. WiOMoRE,

EVIDENCE §

1913,

at 608 (3d ed. 1940).

11. VI J. WIOMoRE,

EVIDENCE

§ 1913, at 608 (3d ed. 1940).

12. See Clegg v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 104 Tex. 280, 283, 137 S.W. 109, 110 (1911)

(written interrogatories); Rice v. Ward, 93 Tex. 532, 536, 56 S.W. 747, 749 (1900).
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common law, their use in Texas is controlled entirely by rules and statutes. 13
Among these is the exclusionary provision of rule 281. A similar rule,
although not always statutory, is followed in most other jurisdictions, 1 4 and
may have been the practice at common law. 15 The justification given by
the Texas courts for this exclusion is that to do otherwise would overemphasize the testimony contained in the deposition.' 6
Under the current rule, both the testimony of a witness who appears in
open court and the testimony contained in a deposition which is merely read
in the courtroom are taken to the jury room preserved in the same
medium-the memories of the jurors. 17 If, however, the deposition itself
were allowed in the jury room, the jurors, having it constantly before them,
could read and re-read it. Since the testimony contained in the deposition
would be present during their deliberations, it would make a stronger
impression on them and be emphasized relative to the in-court testimony.
They could "read, discuss, dissect and, if disposed, torture the words [of the
deposition] from their true meaning.' 8 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that to permit a deposition in the jury room is equivalent to
allowing the deposing witness to attend the jury deliberations. 19
Despite the clear logic of this position, it has not proven to be compelling
in other jurisdictions. Several courts, most notably those in Alabama, have
simply relied on the trial judge's discretion in determining whether depositions should go to the jury room. 20 In addition, some courts, in explaining
13. Reilly v. Buster, 125 Tex. 323, 328, 82 S.W.2d 931, 933 (1935); Garner's Adm'r
v. Cutler's Adm'r, 28 Tex. 175, 183 (1866) (statutes must be "fully and fairly" complied
with); Johnson v. State, 27 Tex. 758, 765 (1865).
14. E.g., Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 115 P. 313, 315 (Cal. 1911);
Gills v. Angelis, 312 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Whitehead v. Seymour,
169 S.E.2d 369, 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969); Rawson v. Curtiss, 19 Ill.
455, 480 (1858);
Skinner v. Neubauer, 74 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 1956). See generally Annot., 57
A.L.R.2d 1011 (1958).
15. See Hillord v. Hall, 81 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1676) (improper to give depositions
to jury during their deliberations, and is ground for new trial if verdict is in favor of
party who did so).
16. Butler v. Abilene Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n, 108 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1937, writ dism'd); England v. Pitts, 56 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1932, writ dism'd); see Harris v. Levy, 217 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1948, no writ); Trinity & B.V. Ry. v. Lunsford, 183 S.W. 112, 114 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1915, no writ).
17. It should be noted, however, that under TEx. R. Civ. P. 287, if the jurors disagree as to the statement made by a witness, they may have that portion of his testimony
read to them from the court reporter's notes.
18. Rawson v. Curtiss, 19 Ill. 455, 480 (1858).
19. State v. Solomon, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 1939).
20. Western Ry. v. Brown, 196 So. 2d 392, 405-406 (Ala. 1967) (trial court discretion); Newport News & M.V.R. v. Mendell, 34 S.W. 1081 (Ky. Ct. App. 1896); Indianapolis & S.E. Trailways, Inc. v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 142 N.E.2d 51.5, 521 (Ohio 1957)
(depositions are properly taken to jury room in exceptional and unusual circumstances).
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why depositions are excluded
either ignored or placed less reliance on the
21
over-emphasis argument.
Significantly, Texas has been cautious in extending the deposition exclusion to other items, even in the face of the argument that the policy against
over-emphasizing certain testimony demands such an extension. Admittedly, the use of certain exhibits which were not truly depositions has been
banned during deliberations on the ground that they were sufficiently similar
22
to depositions, and that it would be error to allow them into a jury room.
Two Texas Court of Civil Appeals cases are exemplary. In Green v.
Gresham,23 the court held it to be error to permit an affidavit, read in
evidence as the testimony of one witness, to be in the jury room since the
affidavit was a deposition within the meaning of the then current statute
which excluded depositions. In the second case, Hall v. Cook,24 the paper
in question contained statements of the testimony two witnesses would give if
present at the trial. Only one of the two witnesses eventually testified. The
court held that it was certain that the paper could not go to the jury room
while it contained both statements, and said that the use of the paper would
be questionable even if the statement of the witness who testified had been
detached. 25 It should be noted that in both of these cases the item excluded
was exceptionally close to being a deposition; it was a written statement,
read as the testimony of a witness.
In other cases, where the exhibit was less similar, Texas courts have
rejected the argument. For example, in Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v.
Wilson,26 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that a verified written
statement of the plaintiff's claim in an action against the railroad for killing
stock was not a deposition and could properly be admitted into a jury
room. 27 Similarly, in Trinity & B.V. Ry. v. Lunsford,28 the Austin Court
of Civil Appeals held that a brief written statement made by the plaintiff
shortly after an accident, which conflicted with his testimony in court, was
not a deposition and should have been allowed to go to the jury room. 29 In
these two cases, the statement in question had not been introduced for the
21. Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 115 P. 313, 315 (Cal. 1911); Indianapolis & S.E. Trailways, Inc. v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 142 N.E.2d 515, 521 (Ohio 1957)

(mentions both arguments); see Western Ry. v. Brown, 196 So. 2d 392, 405-406 (Ala.
1967) (within trial court's discretion to permit depositions unaffected by inadmissible
matter to go to jury room).
22. Bonds v. Lloyd, 218 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, writ
dism'd); Hall v. Cook, 117 S.W. 449, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ); Green v.

Gresham, 53 S.W. 382, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ).
23. 53 S.W. 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ).
24.

117 S.W. 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).

25. Id. at 451.
26. 84 S.W. 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ).
27. Id. at 275.
28.

183 S.W. 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, no writ).

29. Id. at 113.
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purpose of furnishing the testimony of an absent witness, but rather to
establish the making of a claim 8 ° or to impeach, 1 and the similarity to a
deposition was, therefore, considerably lessened.
One case does, however, extend the scope of the deposition exclusion to
include a written statement introduced purely for impeachment purposes and
not as testimony. In Bonds v. Lloyd8 2 excerpts from the transcript of a
court reporter's notes of the testimony of the defendant in another trial had
been put in evidence to impeach him. The El Paso Court of Civil Appeals
held that the exhibit was not "written evidence" within the meaning of rule
281, but was, instead, a deposition, and that it was error to allow the jury to
use it in their deliberations.83 This decision represents the furthest extension of the rule 281 "deposition" exclusion.
In addition to efforts to classify other written statements as "depositions" within the meaning of rule 281, another extension has been suggested. It has been argued that the policy of avoiding over-emphasis
ought to preclude sending back exhibits which are but the tangible embodiment of oral testimony.3 4 This argument proved persuasive to an Arizona
Court of Appeals in Gallagher v. Viking Supply Co.85 There, the court
held that a chart showing the plaintiff's alleged damages was duplicative of
his oral testimony, and that to allow it to go to the jury room would have

unduly emphasized

it.36

This argument has had only limited success in Texas. In Harris v.
Levy, 3 7 a sketch of the scene of a car and truck collision, made by a witness
and attached to his deposition, was said to be properly kept from the jury.
The El Paso Court of Civil Appeals reasoned that the sketch was only the
witness' verbal testimony reduced to "lines and symbols."' 38 The sketch
lacked any value as proof apart from the testimony which it sought to
explain, and the court feared that allowing its use during deliberations would
only have given "undue prominence" to the evidence contained in the
9
deposition.a
An opposite result was reached, however, by the Fort Worth Court of
Civil Appeals in City of Denton v. Hunt.4 0 There, in a highway condemna30. Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. Wilson, 84 S.W. 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ).
31. Trinity & B.V. Ry. v. Lunsford, 183 S.W. 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915,
no writ).
32. 218 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, writ dism'd).
33. Id. at 336.
34. C. MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 217, at 540 n.30 (2d
ed. 1972).
35. 411 P.2d 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
36. Id. at 819.
37. 217 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, no writ).
38. Id. at 158.
39. Id. at 158.
40. 235 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tion suit, a printed chart of the oral testimony of the defendant on direct
examination was prepared. The chart itemized the individual lots, gave the
respective market values of the part of each lot which was to be taken, the
claimed market value of the remainder of such lots before and after
condemnation, and summarized the respective totals thereof. It was held
,that the chart was a "memorandum to which [the witness] referred in
refreshing his memory while on the witness stand," that it was not "in the
form of a deposition of a witness," and that there was no error in permitting
it to go to the jury room.4 '
In each of these two cases, the evidence in question was a pictorial
rendition of a witness' oral testimony-a sketch and a chart-and yet,
though the decisions are almost contemporaneous, the results are conflicting.
This lack of uniformity is susceptible to several explanations. One explanation is that it indicates a reluctance by the Fort Worth court to expand the
exclusion to an area where it was quite logically applied by the El Paso
court. That reluctance, in turn, may well suggest an undercurrent of
dissatisfaction with the exclusion itself.
EVIDENCE APPEALS TO MANY SENSES

The reluctance of the Texas courts to extend the policy of avoiding overemphasis significantly beyond the exclusion of actual depositions probably
results from a realization that despite a certain syllogistic logic, the overemphasis argument is valid only when a narrow view of trial court procedure
is adopted. The argument implicitly assumes that the only evidence against
which the depositions are competing is other oral evidence. This, of course,
is not the case. Although never completely true, it has ceased to be even
remotely so. While submission of non-oral evidence dates back to the
common law, 42 it has become even more important and widespread as
society has become increasingly visually oriented, and as ideas are more
frequently committed to writing.43 Often, therefore, evidence which ap41. Id. at 213.
42. J. THAYER, CASES ON EVIDENCE 720 (2d ed. 1900) states:
Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law, in all countries, than
the submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects
which furnish evidence. The viewing of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a
wound by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged
to be an infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the
examination of writings to determine whether they were "blemished," the inspection
of the implements with which a crime was committed, or of a person alleged, in a
bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another, are a few illustrations of what may
be found abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks, for seven centuries
past.
43. Knepper, Exhibits and Demonstrative Evidence, 30 INS. COUNSEL J. 133 (1963)
("especially since the advent of television, the public has become pictoral minded");

Ladd, Demonstrative Evidence and Expert Opinion, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 ("People are
pictoral-minded today").

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 1, Art. 8

-1976]

COMMENTS

peals to the jurors' aural senses will be controverted not by other oral
testimony, but by evidence which appeals to their visual senses. Photographs, charts, and maps are in constant use in modern trials, and all have a
purely visual appeal.
It must not be assumed, however, that only the senses of sight and sound
may be invoked. Exhibits may be introduced which require the jurors to use
their sense of touch. For example, in Woodward & Lothrop v. Heed,44 the

plaintiff sought to establish a breach of an implied warranty in the sale of a
fur coat. It was her contention that despite normal use and care of the coat,
its fur had worn off. The defendants introduced two expert witnesses who
testified that the coat showed no more than natural wear, and that the fur
had not worn off, but rather was "matted down" and could be restored by a
process of heavy brushing. Noting that -the "physical facts speak louder than
the testimony of experts," the court held that it was proper for the coat to be
put in evidence and inspected and examined by the jurors to determine if the
fur had worn off or was merely matted down. 45 Such a process would
necessarily involve the tactile senses of the jurors.
Similarly, that evidentiary exhibits can be designed to appeal to the jurors'
olfactory and gustatory senses is made clear by cases in other jurisdictions. In
State v. Mercier,46 for example, the jurors were asked to smell certain cans
alleged to have contained liquor. In People v. Kinney,47 the jurors were
allowed to taste some cider to determine whether it was hard or soft.
Undeniably, to allow depositions into the jury room would emphasize
them relative to the purely oral testimony given during the trial; to allow
other forms of tangible evidence, however, such as the furcoat in Woodward
& Lothrop v. Heed, into the jury room would undoubtedly emphasize them
relative to the purely oral testimony. The truth of this assertion is found in
tht same argument that is used against depositions: the presence of any
exhibit in the jury room allows the jurors to examine and inspect it, and
allows its whole weight and force to be constantly before them. The jurors
are not required to merely remember what the fur coat felt like, or what a
photograph showed; they are allowed to take such evidence into deliberations. Clearly, this emphasizes it, yet it is entirely proper under current
48
Texas practice.
DepositionsCompared to Photographs

The fallacy of excluding depositions from the jury room is best demonstrated by comparison to the practice of allowing photographs. That photo44. 44 A.2d 369 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1945).
45. Id. at 370, quoting Reid v. Ehr, 174 N.W. 71, 72 (N.D. 1919).

46. 127 A. 715 (Vt. 1925).
47. 83 N.W. 147 (Mich. 1900).
48. Cases cited note 4 supra,
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graphs are valuable evidence is undisputed; because of this, they are
routinely admitted into evidence, and, at least since 1949, it has been
49
permissible to send them to the jury room.

While two theories of the evidentiary nature of photographs and x-rays
exist, 10 a resolution of that argument is unnecessary here, since the point
sought to be made is equally well supported by both theories. According to
Professor Wigmore, a photograph is no more than the non-verbal expression
of the witness upon whose foundation testimony its authenticity rests. 51 It is
merely that witness' testimony in illustrated form: a "pictoral communication
of a qualified witness who uses this method of communication instead of or
in addition to some other method."' 52 Other authorities disagree, and urge
that once a proper foundation has been established as to the accuracy and
authenticity of a photograph, "it speaks with a certain probative force in
itself."'5 3 Not only may photographs be used to illustrate a witness' testimony, they may be independent "photographic" or "silent" witnesses themselves.

54

Irrespective of whether the photograph is considered to be merely the
illustrated testimony of a human witness, or an independent, silent witness
itself, to allow it to be used by the jurors during their deliberations is to allow
testimony into the jury room. Whether the testimony is that of the human
witness or of the camera is unimportant. Under the over-emphasis argument, it should be improper, and yet the Texas Supreme Court has expressly
held that photographs constitute "written evidence" within the meaning of
rule 281 and may be taken to the jury room. 55 Such a holding indicates
that Texas is not truly committed to the over-emphasis argument. "Written
evidence" must be sent back; 50 non-documentary evidence may be sent
back.5 7 This practice undoubtedly emphasizes both relative to oral evi49. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Crow, 148 Tex. 113, 114, 221 S.W.2d 235, 236
(1949); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Durkee, 193 S.W.2d 222, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Younger Bros. v. Ross, 151 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. Civ.
App-Galveston 1941, writ dism'd); see Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Orr, 147 Tex.
383, 391, 215 S.W.2d 862, 866-67 (1948). But see Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544, 549 (Tex. 1973) (photographs are not written communications
under TEx. R. Civ. P. 167).
50. People v. Bowley, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474 (1963).
51. II J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 791, at 219 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
52. Id. § 793, at 239.
53. C. Scorr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 601, at 476 (1942).
54. Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.C.L. REv. 233, 245 (1946).
.55. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Crow, 148 Tex. 113, 114, 221 S.W.2d 235, 236
(1949).
56. Cases cited note 1 supra.
57. See Linch v. Paris Lumber & Grain Elev. Co., 80 Tex. 23, 35, 15 S.W. 208,
212 (1891); Medrano v. City of El Paso, 231 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI
Paso 1950, no writ); Davis v. Callen, 250 S.W. 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1923, no writ).
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dence, whether as in-court testimony or as depositions. 'If unfairness were
58
the actual concern of the courts, they would not allow this action.
OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEPOSITIONS IN THE JURY

RooM

The over-emphasis argument is untenable since other forms of evidence
which are subject to the same objection are regularly given to a deliberating
jury. It is possible, of course, that other, unexpressed reasons lie behind the
exclusion. Although never suggested by Texas courts, it has been said that
depositions are kept out of the jury room because they contain incompetent
and irrelevant material.59 This rationale, however, presents no problem
since under current Texas practice, without exception, an item must be in
evidence before it can properly go back. 60 If only part of an item is in
evidence, that part must be segregated from the rest of the item before it
may go to the jury room."' It is suggested that this practice could be
extended to depositions; the objectionable portion could simply be deleted
from the copy of the deposition which would go back. Such treatment
would be analogous to the present Texas practice of detaching independent
62
evidence from depositions and allowing that evidence into the jury room.
One reason remains for excluding depositions. It could be argued that to
allow depositions to go to the jury room, with its attendant benefit, would
encourage attorneys to offer a deposition as a witness' testimony when they
might otherwise have produced the live witness at trial, thereby frustrating a
public policy which favored in-court testimony. Such a policy, however,
simply is not applicable in Texas. Although historically a deposition could
not be used if the deponent was available as a witness, and though that rule
58. An
Such a rule
practice" is
memory");
147, 159-60

alternative to the current situation would be a totally exclusionary rule.
has been used. See Eden v. Lingenfelter, 39 Ind. 19, 22-23 (1872) ("better
"not to send the evidence out with the jury, except as they carry it in their
Watson v. Davis, 52 N.C. 138, 140-41 (1859); Outlaw v. Hurdle, 46 N.C.
(1853).

59. Cases cited note 21 supra.
60. Triangle Cab Co. v. Taylor, 190 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1945), afr'd, 144 Tex..568, 192 S.W.2d 143 (1946); Faver v. Bowers, 33 S.W. 131, 133
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ); see Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Lopez, 359 S.W.2d 221, 222

(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, no writ). But see Hilker v. Agricultural Bd. &
Credit Corp., 96 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ dism'd). A memorandum, not marked for identification or formally introduced in evidence, was properly
taken to the jury room; since the memo was read to jury and "exhibited" to them, it was
in evidence for all practical purposes, and objection was held hypercritical. Id. at 546.
61. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Ellis, 421 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler

1967, no writ); Price v. White Line Cab & Baggage Co., 87 S.W.2d 1103, 1105 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1935, writ dism'd); see South Texas Mort. Co. v. Dozier, 158 S.W.
1051, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1913, no writ); Sargent v. Lawrence, 40 S.W. 1075,

1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).
62. Pridgen v. Hill, 12 Tex. 187, 190 (1854); Kaminski v. Kaminczak, 86 S.W.2d

883, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1935, no writ); Frugia v. Trueheart, 106 S.W. 736,
740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ ref'd); Texas & P. Ry. v. Robertson, 35 S.W. 505 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd).
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is still applied in some jurisdictions, it is not the law in Texas. 63 The fact
4
that a witness is present at the trial does not bar the use of his deposition .
In any event, the concern would be needless. The argument ignores the
fact that a witness present at the trial has the opportunity to impress the jury
with his credibility, rendering his testimony more effective than any deposition. 6 5 Moreover, a witness can prepare a chart illustrating the principal
points of his testimony and, if the court consents, that chart may go to the
jury room, thereby securing the very benefit claimed to have been lost by not
reducing the testimony to a deposition. 66 Finally, the argument ignores the
different, yet equally important, policy that jurors should make an enlightened, careful decision. To that end, it should be proper to allow any
evidence to be used which will legitimately aid the jurors in reaching their
67
conclusion.
Such an approach has been suggested in several Texas cases. In 1854, in
Pridgen v. Hill,6 8 the Texas Supreme Court held that statements of
accounts, attached to a deposition, should not have been read aloud, but
rather should have been sent back to the jury room since to merely read
them would "have been of very little service in order to [sic] their due
understanding and computation. ' 69 A similar reason was offered for
allowing copies of an "account sale" to go back to the jury room in Texas &
P. Ry. v. Robertson.70 There, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that
they were "useful memoranda in aid of the recollection of the jury as to the
'71
exact figures, to avoid mistakes in assessing the amount of the damage.
These cases suggest that the test which should govern the taking of items to
the jury room is whether the items will be of legitimate assistance in deciding
63. Masterson, Adversary Depositions and Admissions Under Texas Practice, 10
Sw. L.J. 107, 108 (1956).
64. O'Connor v. Andrews, 81 Tex. 28, 37, 16 S.W. 628, 631 (1891); Rogers v. Yarbrough Const. Co., 291 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Pillow, 268 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215(c), authorizing video-taped depositions, may dramatically
reduce this difference. The enactment of the rule should not, however, prevent the
amendment of rule 281 to allow depositions in the jury room. There is no theoretical
reason why video-taped depositions should not be used during deliberations. If, however, it proves impractical for the jury to operate the equipment, provision could be made
for reducing the deposition to a transcript.
66. City of Denton v. Hunt, 235 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Most evidence will be properly sent to the jury room. Any objections which
might argue against a particular exhibit going back are, moreover, most correctly made
to the introduction of the item into evidence. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Crow,
148 Tex. 113, 116, 221 S.W.2d 235, 237 (1949); Tanner v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n,
438 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

68. 12Tex. 187 (1854).
69. Id. at 190.
70. 35 S.W. 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd),
71. Id,
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the case. Most items in evidence, including depositions, would assist, but
some would not. A rule of trial court discretion, with its obvious flexibility,
72
is the best solution.
CONCLUSION

Under rule 281, depositions are the sole exception to the rule that written
evidence should be permitted in the jury room for use during deliberations.
This exclusion has been explained as a means of avoiding over-emphasis, but
this is only partially correct. Only over-emphasis relative to the other class
of oral evidence, in-court testimony, is prevented; evidence which appeals to
the jurors' other senses is regularly emphasized at the expense of both by
allowing it to go back.
Rule 281 indicates that Texas generally favors the taking of evidence to
the jury room. The exclusion of depositions from this general rule has been
the result of inadequately considered arguments and a reluctance to break
with the past. This situation should be remedied. If the evidence contained
in a deposition would be of help to the jury in determining the issues of a
case, it should be sent back. To suggest that allowing such use will distort the
jurors' judgment through over-emphasis is to argue against permitting any
evidence to enter the jury room. Such an absolute exclusionary rule is
conceivable, but unlikely to be adopted. In any event, since Texas has not
adopted such a rule it is time rule 281 was amended to delete the exclusion
of depositions.
72. This is the position taken by the
(1942).

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
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